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ABSTRACT

Betty Friedan and Juliet Mitchell: Critiques of Ideology and Power
by
Jennie Eagle

Advisor: Dagmar Herzog

My thesis attends to a common thread of critique in two founding documents of “second-wave”
feminism: Betty Friedan’s book The Feminine Mystique (1963) and Juliet Mitchell’s article
“Women: The Longest Revolution” (1966). I am interested in the ways both foundational texts denaturalize male supremacy by defining it as ideological. The concept of ideology as employed by
three notable social theorists – Marx’s concept of a social mythology disseminated by ruling elites to
uphold various forms of hierarchy, operating through internal contradictions; French communist
Louis Althusser’s concept of a social practice disseminated by the institutions of civil society; and
Michel Foucault’s identification of ideology with discourses or regimes of representation that shape
and delimit what can and cannot be said about a given topic – is central to both Friedan’s book and
Mitchell’s article; although Mitchell, in keeping with her British socialist milieu, employs the term
ideology much more extensively than Friedan, both authors provide a broad critical analysis of how
ruling elites define and police “natural” and “deviant” forms of “femininity” and “the family” that
can be summed up as a critical analysis of ideology. My thesis seeks to challenge and broaden the
common critique of “second-wave” feminism as narrowly middle-class and elitist to demonstrate the
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importance of Friedan’s and Mitchell’s insights for subsequent forms of radical social thought. In
the first section, I will examine both the draft versions and the published version of The Feminine
Mystique to show how Friedan explores the intellectual, emotional, and psychological work done by
conservative gender ideology, how she establishes its relationship to ideas of progress and
temporality, and how she attends to the ways in which its gaps, contradictions, and omissions
strengthen rather than weaken its hold on society. In the second section I will perform the same
analysis for Mitchell. I will conclude by analyzing how the work of Friedan and Mitchell helped
pave the way for the critical insights of postmodern Left thought.
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Introduction
Feminism as an ideological conviction and as a social movement has taken shape in
interlocking and mutually reinforcing structures of power and privilege. Its significance – and the
significance of any other social movement trying to alter or abolish these structures – lies in the fact
that, as trans activist Michelle O’Brien notes in “Tracing This Body: Transsexuality,
Pharmaceuticals, and Capitalism,” “[w]e are all in the midst of structures of tremendous violence,
oppression, and exploitation. There is no easy escape or pure distance from them. Our ability to
resist … is deeply inseparable from our ongoing connection to these very systems.”1 To understand
how individuals at different historical moments have been able to craft more or less radical challenges
to these systems, to understand what they could and could not perceive about the changeability or
justice of dominant views of gender relations, we must examine what they thought about power and
ideology.
For a variety of reasons, 19th-century supporters of changes in the legal, economic, and
educational position of women tended to build their arguments on biologist constructions of gender.
They were products of a society in which belief in the possibility and desirability of social change was
powerfully constrained by a naturalist-Darwinist imagination that, even as it acknowledged the
reality of biological and social evolution, assumed there were limits beyond which it could not go.2

1

Michelle O’Brien, “Tracing This Body: Transsexuality, Pharmaceuticals, and Capitalism,” in The Transgender Studies
Reader 2, ed. Susan Stryker and Aren Z. Aizura (New York: Routledge [Taylor & Francis Group, LLC, an imprint of
Informa PLC], 2013), 56-65.
2
See, for example, Monique Wittig, “One Is Not Born A Woman,” in Feminist Theory Reader: Local and Global
Perspectives, 3rd ed., ed. Carole R. McCann and Seung-Kyung Kim (New York: Routledge [Taylor & Francis Group,
LLC, an imprint of Informa PLC], 2013): “feminism in the [19th] century could never resolve its contradictions on the
subject of nature/culture, woman/society. Women started to fight for themselves as a group and rightly considered that
they shared common features as a result of oppression. But for them these features were natural and biological rather
than social. They went so far as to adopt the Darwinist theory of evolution. They did not believe like Darwin, however,
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The political and social environment of the 1960s in which “second-wave” feminism took shape was
very different. By the 1960s, it was easier than it had ever been before to understand that power
relations, not immutable natural laws, shaped what could and could not be said about the nature,
proper functions, and appropriate activities of women (and other social groups), and how prevalent
constructions of these were governed by specifically ideological considerations.
I have chosen to focus on Betty Friedan’s 1963 book The Feminine Mystique and Juliet
Mitchell’s 1966 essay “Women: the Longest Revolution” as key documents in the evolution of the
second-wave feminist project of what Sally Haslanger, in her 2013 book Resisting Reality: Social
Construction and Social Critique, calls “ideology critique.” Ideology critique, in her words, “focuses
on the conceptual and narrative frameworks that we employ in understanding and navigating the
world, especially the social world … it need not introduce a wholly new concept, but can just suggest
a revision to a concept or a new understanding of a concept.”3 For Haslanger, ideology critique is
allied to both critical theory and social constructionism: critical theory, in her words, “is situated
theory … with a commitment to a political movement and its questions,”4 while “one of the main
goals of social constructionism is to lay bare the mechanisms by which social structures are formed
and sustained so that we are better positioned to locate the levers for social change.”5

‘that women were less evolved than men, but they did believe that male and female natures had diverged in the course of
evolutionary development and that society at large reflected this polarization … the early feminists had failed to regard
history as a dynamic process which develops from conflicts of interests. Furthermore, they still believed as men do that
the cause (origin) of their oppression lay within themselves … [they] found themselves at an impasse … they upheld the
illogical principle of ‘equality in difference’ … [t]hey fell back into the trap … [of] the myth of woman.” Wittig, “One
Is Not Born a Woman,” 248-49. What this passage reveals is that the development of a principled rejection of all aspects
of a hegemonic social order is impossible, not simply because of the social order itself (as though it were outside or
separate from attempts to subvert it) but by the contradictions and inconsistencies within ideology critique and critical
theory. This thesis is an attempt to show not how Friedan and Mitchell resolved these contradictions and inconsistencies,
assuming that to be possible, but how they recognized and negotiated them.
3
Sally Haslanger, Resisting Reality: Social Construction and Social Critique (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012),
17-18, Oxford Scholarship Online.
4
Haslanger, Resisting Reality, 22.
5
Haslanger, Resisting Reality, 30.
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Friedan and Mitchell – the latter to a greater extent than the former – anticipated in their works
what would later be a central insight of Foucauldian philosophy: the fact that modernity instantiated
new forms of social power rather than simply removing old restrictions. Michel Foucault in his
landmark 1975 book Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison observed that the Janus faces of
liberal modernity – of “a formally egalitarian juridical framework, made possible by the organization
of a parliamentary, representative régime” – were “systems of micro-power that are essentially nonegalitarian and asymmetrical that we call the disciplines … The … disciplines constituted the
foundation of the formal, juridical liberties.”6 In other words, developments that seem to free the
individual from old restrictions impose new and more insidious ones. This problematizes
emancipatory narratives of “progress” from a “benighted” or “barbaric” past. It forces us to rethink
the nature of social change and to pay heed to the compromised origins and tactics of fights for
social justice.
For both Friedan and Mitchell, modernity is not a one-way street to women’s freedom. Both The
Feminine Mystique and “Women: the Longest Revolution” contain a powerful strain of argument
and implication that anticipates the insight of Foucault described above. Friedan and Mitchell
explore the profoundly ambiguous relationship of “modernity” and “progress” to gendered
hierarchies of power and knowledge. They recognize that whatever changes have occurred in
women’s condition in the 19th- and 20th-century West can be, and have been, used against them.
Furthermore, both Friedan and Mitchell, with their Left backgrounds, are skeptical of attempts to
claim increased power for women based on the very motherhood and domesticity used to
subordinate them, claims which had been prominent in the rhetoric and ideology of earlier women’s

6

Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books
[Random House, Inc., an imprint of RCA], 1978), 222; see also 195-228.
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movements.7 They see that new ways must be found to navigate the tensions within ideological
constructions of “woman” that both deny and enable rights claims. For Friedan and Mitchell,
ideology critique, critical theory, and social constructionism fuse in fascinating explorations of the
nature of knowledge-as-power and its implications for feminist arguments and political strategies.

7

See, for example, William O’Neill, “The Origins of American Feminism,” in The Other Half: Roads to Women’s
Equality, ed. Cynthia Fuchs Epstein and William J. Goode (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Spectrum Books, an imprint of
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971): “while feminism was born out of a revolt against stifling domesticity, and nurtured in the
understanding that for women to be free the entire fabric of their lives had to be rewoven, by the end of the century most
feminists had succumbed to what Charlotte Perkins Gilman called the ‘domestic mythology’ … the effort to escape
domesticity was accompanied by an invocation of the domestic ideal – woman’s freedom road circled back to the home
from which feminism was supposed to liberate her.” O’Neill, “The Origins of American Feminism,” 162-63. We see
here the enduring paradox of resistant social movements: they derive their existence and organizing principles from the
conditions against which they rebel, or are seen to rebel. For more on how Friedan’s Left background influenced her
resistance to the identification of “women” with the “domestic,” see Kirsten Fermaglich and Lisa M. Fine, introduction
to The Feminine Mystique: 50th Anniversary Edition, by Betty Friedan, ed. Kirsten Fermaglich and Lisa M. Fine, Norton
Critical Editions (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.), xiii-xv; Anonymous [Betty Friedan], “UE Fights for
Women Workers,” UE Publication No. 232 (New York: United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America
[UE], 1952), and my discussion of Friedan below. One of the sections in “UE Fights for Women Workers” is titled
“Women Must Have Right to All Jobs”; see Anonymous [Friedan], “UE Fights for Women Workers,” 35.
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Chapter 1
The historical importance of works of radical social critique lies not in their unequivocal
rejection of the status quo or freedom from logics of domination, since radicalism –recognition that
the wrongs of a practice or system are foundational to a society’s existence – is itself a product of
these logics. Attempts to secure greater social justice spring from, and are anchored in, deep
injustice. It is in contradictions, uncertainties, hesitations, and other examples of split consciousness
– in aporias or gaps - that radical flashes of insight can be discerned, which exemplify the creative
tension between acceptance and questioning of dominant social structures.
The act of noticing and criticizing violations of what has gradually become an international
moral ideal – the principle that human flourishing (defined by Martha Nussbaum and others as the
maximum of political, economic, educational, and artistic freedom and opportunity) is an end in
itself and an essential precondition for a just society8 – is an act has taken many forms in many
different historical periods. As Haslanger notes, “the questions we ask arise out of a particular socialhistorical context … it is not necessary to develop a single coherent position in order to promote
social justice.”9 We cannot evaluate historical works of critique on the basis of ideological or
thematic consistency, since, like all texts, they function through multiple unstable and opposed
meanings. But we can evaluate the degree to which they manifest a political understanding of
ideology-as-power.
Betty Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique, which called Cold War US society to task for its
denial of opportunities to women, is both a product of a specific society at a specific historical
8

See, for example, Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2000), https://books.google.com/books?id=9R69I-rpzUC&printsec=frontcover&dq=martha+nussbaum+capabilities&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjkIyr6KrXAhUcM8AKHZWOAw0Q6AEILjAB#v=onepage&q=martha%20nussbaum%20capabilities&f=false.
9
Haslanger, Resisting Reality, 23-25.
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moment and an exemplar of the broader world-historical significance of 1960s and post-1960s
radical social thought. This chapter is a corrective to accounts of Friedan’s work and legacy that
neglect the radical potential of The Feminine Mystique, that focus on its omissions, hesitations, and
totalizing claims without an adequate engagement with its profound insights and subtle analyses.10
Unintentionally, without a clear sense of where her argument led or could lead, Betty
Friedan wrote a book about ideology-as-power. For the purposes of this thesis, and for Friedan’s
historical moment, the central insight of The Feminine Mystique is its elucidation of the ability of
powerful social interests to shape the direction and flow of information about a socially
disempowered group, and to shift the emphasis of this information when and where it suited their
purposes. Friedan’s pre-Foucauldian text made clear the decentralized, ubiquitous, and historically
changeable nature of ideology-as-power; it revealed the interpenetration of individual and societal
tendencies towards hegemonic gender and familial conservatism. Her description of how social
scientists, business interests, and other shapers of public opinion exerted enormous force to keep
women tied to The [implicitly white, Protestant, middle- and upper-class] Home called into
question the very nature of knowledge itself, revealing it to be, if not purely a historical construct,
then liable to ideological exploitation in the service of dominant social structures. The Feminine
Mystique anticipates the later insight of the New Left Marxist-influenced scholar Douglas Hay: “An
10

Such accounts include bell hooks [Gloria Watkins], Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center (Boston: South End
Press, 1984; New York: Routledge [Taylor & Francis Group, LLC, an imprint of Informa PLC], 2015),
https://books.google.com/books?id=L1WvBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1&dq=bell+hooks+betty+friedan&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0a
hUKEwjQ6br5hp_XAhVDRiYKHRYbB_IQ6AEINjAC#v=onepage&q=bell%20hooks%20betty%20friedan&f=false:
“Feminism in the United States has never emerged from the women who are most victimized by sexist oppression … The
Feminine Mystique … was written as if these women did not exist … Friedan’s famous phrase, ‘the problem that has no
name,’ often quoted to describe the condition of women in this society, actually referred to the plight of a select group of
college-educated, middle- and upper-class, married white women.” hooks, Feminist Theory, 1. Rachel Bowlby in “‘The
Problem with No Name’: Rereading Friedan’s ‘The Feminine Mystique,’” Feminist Review 27 (Autumn 1987): 61-75,
JSTOR, reevaluates The Feminine Mystique as a text whose “contradictions in … models of the self, of free choice and
femininity leave all kinds of questions unresolved,” but even Bowlby does not recognize Friedan as a critic of ideology
per se. Bowlby, “‘The Problem with No Name,’” 74.
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ideology endures not by being wholly enforced and rigidly defined. Its effectiveness lies first in its
very elasticity … [and] the fact that it seems to [men] the products of their own minds and their
own experience.”11 We can extend this insight to recognize, as Marx did, that ideology is an
instrument of political and social power in the hands of ruling classes, used to pre-empt criticism of
and obscure alternatives to unjust practices precisely because those classes have power over what
Marx calls “the means of mental production” and can therefore impose their vision of reality on
society at large.12 The Feminine Mystique makes the crucial point that however comfortable, however
“natural,” however desirable the life of a post-World War II white middle-class housewife may seem,
it has a Janus face of foreclosed options, squelched talents, and general malaise.
A number of scholars have used the term “ideology” to describe the book’s critical evaluation
of social norms. Sociologist Dorothy Smith noted the specific engagement of Friedan with the
concept of ideology in her 1987 book The Everyday World as Problematic: A Feminist Sociology:
“[Friedan] [made] central the critique of ideologies at work in our everyday lives … [she] unveiled
the ideological nature of the ‘values,’ ‘norms,’ and ‘beliefs’ concerning women's role and the relations
between the sexes, which we had taken for granted even as we had struggled with the divergence

11

Douglas Hay, “Property, Authority, and the Criminal Law,” in Albion’s Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in EighteenthCentury England, by Douglas Hay, Peter Linebaugh, John G. Rule, E.P. Thompson, and Cal Winslow (New York:
Pantheon Books [Random House, Inc., an imprint of RCA], 1975), 55.
12
Karl Marx, The German Ideology: Critique of Modern German Philosophy According to Its Representatives Feuerbach, B.
Bauer and Stirner, and of German Socialism According to Its Various Prophets, in Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume
V: Marx & Engels 1845-47, ed. Jack Cohen, Maurice Cornforth, Maurice Dobb, E.J. Hobsbawm, James Klugmann,
Margaret Mynatt, James S. Allen et al. (Lawrence & Wishart, 2010), 59,
http://www.hekmatist.com/Marx%20Engles/Marx%20&%20Engels%20Collected%20Works%20Volume%205_%20
Ma%20-%20Karl%20Marx.pdf. The paragraph in which the term “means of mental production” appears reads thus:
“The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e., the class which is the ruling material force of society
is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal,
consequently also controls the means of mental production, so that the ideas of those who lack the means of mental
production are on the whole subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant
material relations, the dominant material relations grasped as ideas; hence of the relations which make the one class the
ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance.” Marx, “The German Ideology,” 59. For more on Marx, see my
discussion of him in relation to the work of Friedan and Mitchell below.
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between the normative and the actually practiced.”13 Stephanie Coontz in her 2011 book A Strange
Stirring: The Feminine Mystique and American Women at the Dawn of the 1960s also notes that
“Friedan was highly effective in exposing the contradictions in [Freudian anti-feminist] ideology.”14
In her 2006 book When Sex Became Gender, Shira Tarrant claims that the work of a “cohort” of
postwar feminist writers – she names Margaret Mead, sociologists Viola Klein and Mirra
Komarovsky, Ruth Herschberger, and Simone de Beauvoir – evinced “methodological parallels …
[with] political theorists more broadly, particularly in regard to critiques of positivism, ideology, and
presupposed knowledge.”15 I shall attempt to demonstrate that this is true of The Feminine Mystique
– and Mitchell’s Women: the Longest Revolution – as well. My intention is to go beyond these
historians’ somewhat cursory examinations of ideology as a second-wave feminist concept, and to reevaluate the works of Friedan and Mitchell as, first and foremost, ideology critiques.
For the purposes of this thesis, I will divide Friedan’s and Mitchell’s critiques into three parts
– analysis of the intellectual and emotional work performed by hegemonic gender ideology, analysis
of its relationship to ideas of progress and temporality, and analysis of contradictions as the source of
its power. I will evaluate the critiques using the mutually constitutive variations on the concept of
ideology promulgated by Marx, French communist Louis Althusser, and Foucault, as described by
13

Dorothy E. Smith, The Everyday World as Problematic: A Feminist Sociology (Boston: Northeastern University Press,
1987), 50, Social Theory.
14
Stephanie Coontz, A Strange Stirring: The Feminine Mystique and American Women at the Dawn of the 1960s (New
York: Basic Books [Perseus Books Group]), 2011), 162, Kindle.
15
Shira Tarrant, When Sex Became Gender, Perspectives on Gender (New York: Routledge [Taylor & Francis Group, an
imprint of Informa PLC], 2006), 21. For more on Mead, see Friedan’s criticisms of her described below; for more on
Klein, see her book The Feminine Character: History of an Ideology, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd, 1946;
Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1971), in which she explicitly states her use of a framework emphasizing the
“Sociology of Knowledge”; see Klein, The Feminine Character, 2-3. For more on Komarovsky, see her book Women in
the Modern World: Their Education and Dilemmas (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1953), quoted below in
Coontz, A Strange Stirring, and criticized by Friedan as accommodating the feminine mystique; see Betty Friedan, The
Feminine Mystique: 50th Anniversary Edition, ed. Kirsten Fermaglich and Lisa M. Fine, Norton Critical Editions (New
York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2013), 110-11. For more on Ruth Herschberger, see her book Adam’s Rib (New York:
Pellegrini & Cudahy, 1948), quoted below. For more on de Beauvoir, see Juliet Mitchell’s summations and my quotes
of The Second Sex below.
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British social workers Malcolm Carey and Victoria Foster in their article “Social work, ideology, and
the limits of post-hegemony.”16 Marx, in Carey and Foster’s words, saw ideology as “[inverting] our
understandings of a materially determined political economy upon which inequitable social relations
are established and maintained [emphasis in the original]”17; Althusser refined this concept with his
distinction between “[r]epressive” and “ideological” state apparatuses, thus “[privileging] the role of
civil society in generating an imaginary or illusionary relationship between people and their
conditions of existence”18; and Foucault shifted the emphasis to the role of “discourse formation(s)
and their capacity to create professional statements, concepts and strategies (within medicine, social
work, education, and so on) that situate speakers, and position, subjugate or elevate social actors
through codes of language that determine what can and cannot be said, as well as influencing more
general perception and understanding [emphasis in the original].”19 These views of ideology enable
us to understand what was so revolutionary about the work of Friedan and Mitchell. My account of

16

Malcolm Carey and Victoria Foster, “Social work, ideology, discourse and the limits of post-hegemony,” Journal of
Social Work 13, no. 3 (2013): 248-66, SAGE Journals.
17
Carey and Foster, “Social work,” 250.
18
Carey and Foster, “Social work,” 250. British New Left theorist Stuart Hall in his 1985 article “Signification,
Representation, Ideology: Althusser and the Post-Structuralist Debates,” Critical Studies in Mass Communication 2, no. 2
(June 1985): 91-114, EBSCO Publishing, notes that one of Althusser’s core propositions is “the insistence that ideology
is practice. That is, it appears in practices located within the rituals of specific apparatuses or social institutions and
organizations … Ideologies are the frameworks of thinking and calculation about the world – the ‘ideas’ which people
use to figure out how the social world works, what their place is in it and what they ought to do … Althusser … places
the emphasis on where ideas appear, where mental events register or are realized, as social phenomena [emphasis in the
original].” The term “social phenomena,” in my view, is crucial for understanding ideology as a phenomenon of broad
cultural significance. Hall, “Signification, Representation, Ideology,” 99. For more on Althusser, see my discussion of
him in relation to Friedan’s and Mitchell’s work below.
19
Carey and Foster, “Social work,” 251. Foucault in his landmark The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction,
trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books [Random House, Inc., an imprint of Advance Publications, Inc.],
1990), pointed out that since power in any society is diffuse and multifaceted, there is correspondingly “no single locus
of great Refusal, no soul of revolt, source of all rebellions, or pure law of the revolutionary. Instead there is a plurality of
resistances, each of them a special case: resistances that are possible, necessary, improbable; others that are spontaneous,
savage, solitary, concerted, rampant, or violent; still others that are quick to compromise, interested, or sacrificial; by
definition, they can only exist in the strategic field of power relations.” Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 95-96. This
insight of Foucault’s is central to understanding the evolution of resistant social movements and their arguments. For
more on Foucault, see my discussion of him in relation to the work of Friedan and Mitchell below.
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Friedan’s critique will rely both on original drafts of The Feminine Mystique and the final published
version of the text.
I.

Hegemonic Gender Ideology’s Intellectual-Emotional Work

The Feminine Mystique’s legendary opening sentence – “The problem lay buried, unspoken, for
many years in the minds of American women”20 – strikingly illustrates the truth of Sally Haslanger’s
contention that “[o]ne crucial task of ideology critique is to reveal ideology as such [emphasis
added].”21 Friedan employs a fairly similar, if more extended, metaphor in her description of
changes in the portrayal of heroines in women’s magazines over a 20-year period: “A geologist brings
up a core of mud from the bottom of the ocean and sees layers of sediment as sharp as a razor blade
deposited over the years – clues to changes in the geological evolution of the earth.”22 Buried, brings
up, bottom, sediment, deposited – these are striking metaphors to describe that facet of ideology
critique in which, in Haslanger’s words, “it is necessary to articulate [ideology] and make it accessible
for critical reflection.”23 The implication is that Friedan is a kind of explorer, a pioneer. On page 23
she writes, “[The] women I have talked to, who are finally listening to [their] inner voice, seem in
some incredible way to be groping through to a truth that has defied the experts. I think the experts
in a great many fields have been holding pieces of that truth under their microscopes for a long time
without realizing it.”24 With images of touch struggling through thickly-layered substances –
bringing up a core of mud, groping through – Friedan testifies to the socially-constructed nature of
“truth” and the enormous obstacles to understanding the particular “truth” she struggles to impress

20

Betty Friedan, The Feminine Mystique, 9.
Haslanger, Resisting Reality, 19.
22
Friedan, The Feminine Mystique, 28, 28-36.
23
Haslanger, Resisting Reality, 19.
24
Friedan, The Feminine Mystique, 23.
21
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on her readers. Friedan’s book itself contains a substratum of buried, fragmented Marxist-influenced
insights.
“[One] goal of ideology critique,” writes Haslanger, “is to elucidate the conceptual and narrative
frameworks that undergird our social interaction, thus making them available for critical
examination.”25 What is important for this thesis is the multipronged nature of Friedan’s attempt to
“dissect the morning mist” – a phrase originally used by 19th-century British economist Harriet
Martineau in her criticism of the idea of women’s “influence” as a legitimate substitute for political
power.26 Friedan is keenly attuned to the power of words and their construction: “The image [of
femininity dominant in US society],” she writes in an early draft of The Feminine Mystique, “has the
power to create mindless women, since words are what the mind grows on.”27 Thus she examines a
wide variety of printed texts – fiction and nonfiction in women’s magazines, advertisements, socialscientific and psychoanalytic writings – and establishes points of continuity between them; in other
words, she establishes them as forms of ideological work. Both the published and unpublished
versions of The Feminine Mystique grapple with the problem of how to unveil and challenge
assumptions largely unchallenged. Friedan’s early drafts of The Feminine Mystique, as we will see,
often go more deeply into the psychological roots of hegemonic gender ideology than does the
book’s final, published version.
Friedan’s understanding of the economic basis of the feminine mystique – her Marxistinfluenced delineation of the social forces converging to trap women in a domestic future, to
paraphrase Sara Pursley in her 2012 dissertation “A Race Against Time: Governing Femininity and
25

Haslanger, Resisting Reality, 19.
Harriet Martineau, Society in America, vol. I (London: Saunders and Otley, 1837),
http://media.pfeiffer.edu/lridener/DSS/Martineau/v1p1c3s7.html.
27
Betty Friedan, draft of The Feminine Mystique, p. 186, Series III, Box 44, Folder 580, Betty Friedan Papers, Radcliffe
Institute, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.
26
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Reproducing the Future in Revolutionary Iraq, 1945-1963”28 – underwrites her critique of its
overwhelming emotional and intellectual power. The “richness of honest, objective, concrete,
realistic domestic detail – the color of walls or lipstick, the exact temperature of the oven” found in
the “service article”29 of women’s magazines, the “increasing mindlessness, increasing emphasis on
things … [forces] the men who make the images to see women only as thing-buyers.”30 Friedan’s
startlingly blunt coda to this build-up of insights is that “the really crucial function, the really
important role that women serve as housewives is to buy more things for the house. In all the talk of
femininity and woman’s role, one forgets that the real business of America is business. But the
perpetuation of housewifery, the growth of the feminine mystique, makes sense (and dollars) when
one realizes that women are the chief customers of American business [emphasis in the original].”31
It is not out of place to note that Calvin Coolidge, who coined the phrase “the business of America is
business,” embodied the Puritan-influenced Protestant Ethic more than any other US president in
the first half of the 20th century.
In the Marxist schema, as noted above, ideologies are underwritten by economic conditions.
Friedan exposes the class basis of cultural prescriptions for full-time domesticity by analyzing the
variety of economic-aesthetic desires women’s magazines arouse in their readers. One Texas
housewife, in a story revealingly titled “‘How America Lives,’” “‘sits on a pale aqua satin sofa gazing
out her picture window … wearing rouge, powder, and lipstick … her cotton dress … immaculately
fresh.’”32 Janice, presumably white and upper-middle-class, is, in her own words, “‘free to play

28

Sara Pursley, “A Race Against Time: Governing Femininity and Reproducing the Future in Revolutionary Iraq, 194563” (Ph.D diss., CUNY Graduate Center, 2012), 11, 20,
http://library.gc.cuny.edu.central.ezproxy.cuny.edu:2048/legacy/items/show/13655.
29
Friedan, The Feminine Mystique, 44, 43.
30
Friedan, The Feminine Mystique, 52-53.
31
Friedan, The Feminine Mystique, 173.
32
Friedan, The Feminine Mystique, 51.

12

bridge, attend club meetings, or stay home and read, listen to Beethoven, and just plain loaf … I
love my home … I’m so grateful for my blessings … [my] big comfortable house … good health and
faith in God and such material possessions as two cars, two TV’s [sic] and two fireplaces.’”33 Good
health, faith in God, two cars, two TVs, two fireplaces – this is, of course, the embodiment of the
Protestant Ethic’s marriage of material wealth and “eternal verities” sentimentalism. A later
observation in “The Sexual Sell,” Friedan’s chapter on the advertising industry’s manipulation of
women’s consumption habits, quotes an advertiser’s report on “[a] new combination of an almost
religious belief in the importance and beauty of married life on the one hand, and the productcentered outlook, on the other[.]”34
More pointedly, Friedan’s biting apothegm about “Housewife Writers” Jean Kerr, Shirley
Jackson, and Phyllis McGinley – their comic writings “may or may not overlook the housekeeper or
maid who really makes the beds”35 – and her quote from an advertiser’s report in “The Sexual Sell” –
“‘housekeeping … is a task for which society hires the lowliest, least-trained, most trod-upon
individuals and groups’”36 – anticipate what would later become a crucial insight of feminist
historians: the US Cult of Domesticity, from the 18th through the 20th centuries, was underwritten
by the easy access of white women in comfortable circumstances to low-paid domestic service, often
provided by African-Americans and other racialized minority groups.37 The racial-economic
interests of white men and women had underwritten their belief in a subordinate role for the latter.
Following Marxist historian Eleanor Flexner, Friedan also notes that, during the struggle for
33
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women’s suffrage, “[b]ehind the cries of ‘save femininity,’ ‘save the home,’ could … be glimpsed the
influence of political machines, quailing at the very thought of what … women would do if they got
the vote … [brewers] as well as other business interests, especially those that depended on underpaid
labor of children and women, openly lobbied against the woman’s suffrage amendment.”38 As
Jessica Weiss notes in her 2012 article “‘Fraud of Femininity’: Domesticity, Selflessness, and
Individualism in Responses to Betty Friedan,”39 about responses to Friedan’s McCall’s excerpt from
The Feminine Mystique in March 1963, “[t]hose who identified women with the home and
capitalism saw them as the glue that held the family together.”40
Several short but tantalizing moments in Friedan’s early drafts of The Feminine Mystique point to
the intersection of race, class, and gender as categories of social hierarchy. In the first reference,
Friedan connects the socially-imposed ignorance of white Southern women to their virulent racism:
“The mind [sic] of the New Orleans women, shrieking, cursing, spitting at the little Negro girls
entering school, was [sic] created partly by the ideas they were never given, [sic] to read about. But
where does the violence come from, in these feminine Southern housewife [sic], in those other happy
housewives who stormed in such fury at [a Black girl integrating a school]?”41 The implication here is
that sexist limitations help to reinforce racism; the Southern white woman’s world is shrunk by editors
writing for a female audience assumed to be white and middle-class. Editors are, in the published
version of The Feminine Mystique, “truncating women’s minds.”42 In a later chapter, Friedan points
to women of the US past as examples of “[strength] and independence, work and responsibility, self-
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confidence, self-discipline, courage – freedom and equality … the New England settlers, the
westward pioneers, and the mothers and daughters who came in the steerage from Ireland and Italy,
Russia and Poland, or as slaves from Africa, and worked in the sweatshops or the laundries [emphasis
added].”43 In the published version of this latter passage, “slaves from Africa” is omitted, for reasons
that are not clear.44
The Feminine Mystique’s lack of an extended, sophisticated analysis of racism is one of the book’s
major problems, as many commentators have noted.45 But to adequately understand why this is the
case, we need to grasp Friedan’s larger point about the conservative political and social climate
following the psychological dislocations of the Great Depression and World War II. “The uncritical
acceptance of Freudian doctrine in America was caused, at least in part, by the very relief it provided
from uncomfortable questions about objective realities … It provided a convenient escape from the
atom bomb, McCarthy, all the disconcerting problems that might spoil the taste of steaks,”46 she
writes, at a time when the Red Scare was still very much alive. “It was easier” in the postwar era,
“safer, to think about love and sex than about communism, McCarthy, and the uncontrolled bomb
… easier to look for Freudian sexual roots in man’s behavior, his ideas, and his wars than to look
critically at his society and act constructively to right its wrongs.”47 Even social scientists, Friedan
writes in an unpublished draft, make “a deliberate conscious choice [to insist that] regardless of the
truth, regardless of the human possibilities, it is better not to move ahead [underline in the
43
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original]”;48 for Friedan, this is an abuse of social science, the purpose of which is to challenge
cultural norms rather than reinforce them. The psychological and sociological model of
functionalism, “an attempt to make social science more ‘scientific’ by … studying an institution only
in terms of its function within its own society … to avert unscientific value judgments,”49 was “an
easy out … [from] the need to formulate questions and answers that would be inevitably
controversial (at a time in academic circles, as in America as a whole, when controversy was not
welcome.”50 Ideology can function simply by making certain questions and answers invisible. A
climate of paranoia shades inexorably into a climate of intellectual and emotional brainwashing.
The ideological work of educators “more concerned with their students’ future capacity for
sexual orgasm than with their future use of trained intelligence”51 is effective precisely because it
plays on the combination of intellectual and emotional prohibitions women students have inherited.
Friedan quotes psychoanalyst Helene Deutsch’s fatwa against women’s intelligence – “‘the
intellectual woman is masculinized; in her warm, intuitive knowledge has yielded to cold
unproductive thinking’” – and adds the devastating observation: “A girl doesn’t have to be very lazy,
very unsure, to take the hint … she would have to do some very cold hard thinking about her own
warm, intuitive knowledge to challenge this authoritative statement.”52 This deconstruction of a
leading woman psychoanalyst’s opposition to the intellectual development of other women is one of
the most brilliant exposés of ideological work in the brilliant exposé that is The Feminine Mystique.
A statement like Deutsch’s has the power to disarm all possible resistance, to foreclose all suspicion
of the status quo. What cultural forces are so invested in the disempowerment of a social group that
48
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even its “educators … [protect] [them] from the temptation to use their critical, creative intelligence
– by the ingenious method of educating it not to be critical or creative[?]”53
II.

Hegemonic Gender Ideology, Progress, and Temporality

“Certainly, all the words written for American women today, telling them how to adjust to their
role as women … assume this is the end. In the women’s magazines – read by tens of millions of
American women, reflecting, and shaping, their identity, their dreams, and the horizon of their
world, this is woman, as she was, and is, and will be [underline in the original],” writes Friedan in an
unpublished draft of The Feminine Mystique.54 “I do not think,” she writes on the next page of the
draft, “this image is the end – women [sic] as she is and was and always will be – for the fact is that
this image has changed, even in the past 20 years, and is still changing … [but] … this image …
denies the actuality of changing life [underline in the original].”55 Change does not automatically
equal progress. “My generation of women grew up, already so different, that we felt no need to fight
battles for women … No one told us of the gap between winning freedom, and using it,”56 she writes
in the draft. To a certain extent Friedan’s observations chime with those of Martin Luther King in
his iconic Letter from a Birmingham Jail, published the same year: “time itself is neutral … [human]
progress never rolls in on the wheels of inevitability … without … hard work, time itself becomes an
ally of the forces of social stagnation.”57
Chapter 2 of Friedan’s book is designed to claim the Great Depression as a time when white,
middle-class women’s confinement to domesticity did not seem immutable; when career aspirations
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for women were not condemned as they were in the postwar era.58 In actual fact, many countries
around the world had curtailed women’s employment opportunities during the Great Depression –
and the windows of opportunity for entry into “male” fields opened by World War II had closed
when the war ended.59 But for the purposes of this thesis, the point is not to condemn Friedan for
her deviation from historical accuracy, but to see the creativity and ingenuity of her point that the
postwar domestic ideal was a historical development and not a biological or social necessity. The
troubled aftermath of a depression and a war was the backdrop for “avoiding personal commitment
to truth in a catch-all commitment to ‘home’ and ‘family.’ For the social worker, the psychologist
and the numerous ‘family’ counselors … therapy for private patients on personal problems of sex,
personality, and interpersonal relations was safer and more lucrative than probing too deeply for the
common causes of mankind’s suffering.”60 “Under the Freudian microscope … a very different
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concept of family began to emerge … singled out for special attention was the ‘mother.’ It was
suddenly discovered that the mother could be blamed for almost everything … By unfortunate
coincidence, this attack against mothers came about at [sic] the same time that American women
were beginning to use the rights of their emancipation.”61 Here, as we will see in the following
chapter, Friedan anticipates Juliet Mitchell’s claim that the family is an ideological and not a natural
structure.
As historian Rebecca Jo Plant has noted in her book Mom: The Transformation of Motherhood in
Modern America, Friedan at once reproduces and challenges the misogynistic claims made by
psychoanalysis and social science about white, middle-class women as mothers.62 For this thesis, the
insight can be modified into the claim that Friedan’s arguments both reify and question ideologies of
the normal family. Friedan’s book reflects a tension that Rebecca Jo Plant has identified in postwar
ideologies of motherhood: “despite their tendency to portray maternal instinct in biological terms,
experts betrayed profound doubts about middle-class women’s ‘natural’ capacities as nurturers.”63
Although Friedan does not articulate a coherent argument for the historical changeability of the
concept of motherhood itself, she makes it clear that the forms of social reproduction predominant
in the postwar United States are not final or natural, but historically conditioned.
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In evaluating Freud’s work, Friedan makes perhaps her most explicit social-constructionist and
relativist claim: “no social scientist can completely free himself from the prison of his own culture: he
can only interpret what he observes in the scientific framework of his own time … Much of what
Freud believed to be biological, instinctual, and changeless has been shown by modern research to be
a result of specific cultural causes.”64 In this she echoes the earlier emphasis of psychoanalyst Karen
Horney – and Freud himself in his later years – on the significance of environmental influences in
the formation of personality; Horney had claimed in 1939 that ‘[t]he relevant factor[s] in the genesis
of neurosis [are] … adverse influences which make a child feel helpless and defenseless.”65 (Friedan
quotes Horney at the beginning of Chapter 13, “The Forfeited Self,” as an example of a thinker who
“postulate[s] some positive growth tendency within the organism, which, from within, drives it to
fuller development, to self-realization.”)66 Freud’s alleged belief in eating as a major indicator of
conflict between mother and child, for example, is challenged by Friedan: “a noticeable decline in
children’s ‘eating problems’ … has the culture removed eating as a focus for early childhood
problems – by the American emphasis on permissiveness in child care, or simply by the fact that in
our affluent society food has become less a cause for anxiety in mothers?”67 Friedan’s quote of a
sociologist’s claim that “‘[modern] ‘scientific child care’ enforces a constant supervision and diffused
worrying … in an intensely competitive milieu middle-class parents from the day of birth are
constantly comparing their own child’s development with that of the neighbors’ children’”68 opens
dominant US ideals of childrearing to critical scrutiny. The very “glorification of ‘woman’s role’ …
seems to be in proportion to society’s reluctance to treat women as complete human beings; for the
64
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less real function that role has, the more it is decorated with meaningless details to conceal its emptiness.
This phenomenon has been noted, in general terms, in the annals of social science and history.”69
Here, again, Friedan may have been influenced by Horney: “The restriction of woman to a private
emotional sphere leads to inferiority feelings,” said Horney in a speech to the National Federation of
Business and Professional Women’s Clubs in July 1935, “because a sound and secure self-confidence
must draw on a broad basis of human qualities – such as initiative, courage, independence, capacity
for mastering situations, talents … [a]s long as homemaking was a big task with plenty of
responsibilities … woman knew that she was a constructive factor in the economic process … With
the change in social conditions, woman has lost one important foundation for feeling herself
valuable.”70
Friedan devotes a segment of “The Sex-Directed Educators” to challenging several implicit
premises of “‘family-life education’”71: “It is functional ‘knowledge’ that ‘only the exceptional
woman can make a go of a commitment to a career. Of course, since most women in the past have
not had careers, the few who did were all ‘exceptional.’”72 In criticizing Margaret Mead for her
“vision … [that] women, by merely being women and bearing children, will earn the same respect
accorded men for their creative achievements,” Friedan notes that “[in] such a world … [femininity]
69

Friedan, The Feminine Mystique, 199.
Karen Horney, “Woman’s Fear of Action (1935),” in The Unknown Karen Horney: Essays on Gender, Culture, and
Psychoanalysis, ed. Bernard J. Paris (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 121. Other feminist writers of the same
period made similar points. Ellen Dorothy Abb, in her now-forgotten polemic What Fools We Women Be! (London:
Cassell and Company, Ltd, 1937), wrote, “[a]t one time women could be satisfied with the home, when it was a centre
of productive activities of every kind. But now that the interest has been [page 16] taken out of the home and woman is
isolated in it all day long, she is wasted and she is bored. The home of to-day is rarely sufficient occupation for the
grown-up woman.” Abb, What Fools We Women Be!, 15-16. A generation earlier, in 1914, novelist James Oppenheim
claimed that since “the industries that were formerly kept within the home have gone into the mills … [i]n [the] home,
as the home must be constituted in this day, [woman] cannot get a real and sufficient outlet for [her] energy.” See
“Feminist a Better Home Maker than the Old-Time Wife,” New York Times May 3, 1914, ProQuest Historical
Newspapers. Note that Horney, Abb, and Oppenheim did not seek to entirely disentangle the discursive linkage
between “woman” and “home,” but urged an adaptation to changed realities.
71
Friedan, The Feminine Mystique, 141.
72
Friedan, The Feminine Mystique, 143.
70

21

becomes a value which society must protect from the destructive onrush of civilization like the
vanishing buffalo.”73 Biology itself is not outside history: “Female biology … may be changeless …
but the nature of the human relationship to biology has changed … Even … simple [biological needs
of hunger, thirst, and sex] in men or women today, are not the same as they were in the Stone Age or
in the South Sea cultures.”74 Belief in biology as destiny actually contributes to a “high incidence of
cramps with menstruation, nausea and vomiting during pregnancy, depression with childbirth, and
severe physiological and psychological distress at menopause[,] [which] have come to be accepted as
a ‘normal’ part of feminine biology. Are these stigmata … part of the fixed and eternal nature of
women as they are popularly assumed to be?”75 We see here, and in analysis of Mead’s writings
quoted below, how Friedan shows up the timidity, instability, and vacillation of Mead’s writings on
gender roles – how Friedan points out Mead’s oscillation between viewing women as creatures of
(seemingly timeless) biology and creatures of (alterable) environment.
Friedan’s close reading of Mead explores the role played by the idea of progress in Western social
thought. The concept of progress – and its obstruction – forms a major theme in Friedan’s critique.
“To live according to the feminine mystique depends on a reversal of history, a devaluation of
human progress … even the mystique makers felt the need to defend themselves against the
question, ‘are we, in suggesting that women might … recapture some of their functions around the
home … trying to turn back the clock of progress?’ Progress is not progress, they argued.”76 In
“Stepford U.S.A.: Second-Wave Feminism, Domestic Labor, and the Representation of National
Time,” Jane Elliott argues that The Feminine Mystique “consistently argues that women’s oppression
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is experienced primarily as a temporal problem … [s]tuck in the same repetitive drudgery,
[housewives] trudge through the ‘endless boring days’ that constitute static time.”77 The paradox of
progress-stasis is one of many functional contradictions of the feminine mystique.
III.

Hegemonic Gender Ideology’s Althusserian Dialectics

“Instead of destroying the old prejudices that restricted women’s lives, [postwar] social science in
America merely gave them new authority. By a curious circular process, the insights of psychology
and anthropology and sociology, which should have been powerful weapons to free women,
somehow canceled each other out, trapping women in dead center,” writes Friedan [emphasis
added].78 Friedan employs a variant of the Hegelian-Marxist concept of “supersession” (“the
maintenance-of-what-has-been-negated-in-its-very-negation” [emphasis in the original], to quote
Althusser in his 1965 book For Marx) to explain the survival of conservative gender ideology in an
ostensibly democratic society.79 Her close reading of the work of Margaret Mead and other social
theorists reveals how easily egalitarian social-scientific language can be redirected from emancipatory
ends to maintain an uneasy status quo – which, of course, makes it all the more bewildering. As
Stephanie Coontz notes in A Strange Stirring, “Postwar ideology was particularly disorienting for
many women because it often came in the guise of a forward-thinking rejection of ‘traditional’ ideas
about gender and sexuality.”80 Indeed, as Friedan herself notes, “the feminine mystique itself – with
its acknowledgement of woman as subject and not just object of the sexual act, and its assumption
that her active, willing participation was essential to man’s pleasure – could not have come without
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the [partial] emancipation of women to human equality.”81 Friedan illustrates how easily ideologies
and discourses of emancipation can be deployed in the service of new forms of oppression. She also
illustrates the extent to which emancipation itself can be given with one hand and taken away with
the other, how it can function as the more “positive” side of a coin of social control.
Friedan’s criticism of Margaret Mead, the “Housewife Writers,” and other women who shape
public opinion in the direction of the feminine mystique is extraordinarily subtle and incisive,
profoundly attuned to their own troubled subject positions as women in a male-dominated world.
In Chapter 2, “The Happy Housewife Heroine,” Friedan points to the paradox of Dorothy
Thompson, “newspaper woman, foreign correspondent, famous columnist,” telling readers of the
Ladies’ Home Journal they “can save more money by their managerial talents inside the home than
they can bring into it by outside work.”82 Women writers and professionals serve as a buffer class,
their privilege of work outside the home resting on the domestic containment of other women: “If
the real women editors [of women’s magazines] were not, somehow, able to give up their own
careers, all the more reason to ‘help’ other women fulfill themselves as wives and mothers.”83 In one
of her unpublished drafts Friedan speculates, “It may not be relevant [Friedan seems to think that
the word “relevant” does as well as the word “irrelevant” for clarifying her point], whether a
brilliantly successful woman in a science dominated by men wanted her singular stature diminished
by the influx of a lot of other women into such fields … the role of Margaret Mead as the
professional spokesman [sic] of femininity would have been less important, if more women moved
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on … to take their own place on the frontiers of thought … instead of listening to what [Mead] said
in her books.”84
As we have already seen, Friedan recognizes in the published text that Mead’s “influence, for
women, has been a paradox. A mystique takes what it needs from any thinker of the time [emphasis
added]”85 – in other words, it exploits the ambiguities, retreats, and hesitations embedded in
“liberal,” “emancipatory” ideologies and makes them “[cancel] each other out.” Friedan quotes
Mead’s acknowledgement that the “‘great variety of ways … in which the roles of the two sexes have
been patterned’” are often “‘flatly contradictory to each other,” but Mead turns around to claim that
“we always find the patterning … Are we dealing with a [biological, social, and/or cultural
requirement] that … although not so deeply rooted, still is so very socially convenient and so well
tried that it would be uneconomical to flout it?’”86 I would argue that Friedan’s quote of Mead’s
intellectual contortions shows how gender conservatism can function by fusing with or balancing
“feminist” language, in the dialectical sense of contradictions and inconsistencies “[canceling] each
other out.” I think this point is further illustrated when Friedan quotes Mead’s claim that the
“‘tendency to make artificial definitions that limit an activity to one sex … is a vicious circle …
[those] who would break the circle are themselves a product of it, express some of its defects in their
every gesture, may only be strong enough to challenge it, not able actually to break it.’”87 The very
caution of Mead’s language, her vacillations, her inconsistencies, strengthens the feminine mystique.
Friedan captures a central paradox of liberal discourse: its potential both to reinforce and oppose
structures of domination.
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This is in part because of what Friedan calls the “therapeutic caution, the manipulative
superiority, typical of too many American social scientists.”88 Recall that the “[feminine] mystique is
broadcast by the very agents of education and social science that are supposed to be the chief enemies
of prejudice.”89 Postwar psychoanalysis and social science were mutually reinforcing in their
pronouncements on women’s appropriate nature and role.90 Friedan’s “sex-directed educator,”
influenced by both fields of study, a product of the modernizing optimism of the postwar United
States, feeds his students “a sophisticated soup of uncritical prescriptions and presentiments far more
binding on the mind and prejudicial to the future than all the traditional do’s and don’ts.”91
University education for US women, “as psychology and anthropology and sociology permeated the
total scholarly atmosphere,” has, to use a piquant phrase of a woman quoted in the 1960 Redbook
magazine article “Why Young Mothers Feel Trapped, “‘come full circle and the American housewife
is once again trapped in a squirrel cage … the cage is now a modern plate-glass-and-broadloom
ranch house or a convenient modern apartment.’”92 Friedan’s quote of the “‘squirrel cage’”
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metaphor indicates that the difficulty of challenging the boundaries of the feminine mystique lies
precisely in the modernity of the social-scientific and psychoanalytic doctrines that buttress it.
“Freud’s concept of the superego helped to free man from the tyranny of the ‘shoulds,’ the tyranny
of the past … [y]et Freudian thought helped create a new superego that paralyzes educated modern
American women – a new tyranny of the ‘shoulds,’ which chains women to an old image, prohibits
choice and growth, and denies them individual identity.”93 Friedan was not, of course, the first
person to realize that the language of freedom and progress can have an underside of repression and
stagnation. In her 1949 polemic Adam’s Rib Ruth Herschberger responded to psychoanalyst Erich
Fromm’s hope that “‘social conditions can be created which will develop the positive side of the
peculiarities of persons, sexes, and national groups’”94 thus: “[there] is no rule by which we must
develop only what we have ‘uniquely’ to offer … [the] progressive school with its admonition to ‘be
creative’ often has preconceptions of what the creative is to be. These premeditated potentialities are
given a few years of grace in which to emerge, but if they have not come out of hiding by that time –
back to the birch rod.”95
The insidious uses to which the supposedly emancipatory, modernizing language of “creativity”96
can be put are abundantly in evidence in Friedan’s book. Friedan quotes a motivational research
expert who claims that he has “helped [woman] rediscover the home as the expression of her
creativeness … If [a manufacturer] tells [a woman] that all she can be is a wife and mother, she will
spit in his face. But we … liberate her need to be creative in the kitchen [emphasis added].”97 This
statement is a masterful combination of a carrot and a stick; it entices women into the trap of Hansel
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and Gretel’s gingerbread house. “Liberation” is here used for conservative purposes. In Friedan’s
words, “[education], independence, growing individuality, everything that made [women] ready for
other purposes had constantly to be countered, channeled back to the home.”98 In fact, claims an
advertising publication, “‘[the] modern bride seeks as a conscious goal that which in many cases her
grandmother saw as a blind fate and her mother as slavery: to belong to a man, to have a home and
children of her own, to choose among all possible careers the career of wife-mother-homemaker
[emphasis added].’”99 The language of consciousness and choice is here used to give the illusion of
freedom. The term “illusion,” in Friedan’s hands, signifies advertisers’ pre-emption of women’s
desires for intelligence, independence, “creativity”; “a certain cleaning device … let the housewife
have the illusion that she has become ‘a professional, an expert’”100; “Science should not relieve
housewives of too much drudgery; it must concentrate instead on creating the illusion of that sense
of achievement that housewives seem to need [emphasis in the original].”101
Friedan and, later, Mitchell, imply but do not state that ideologies of modernity, of progress, of
creativity, can themselves be obstacles to social justice. The very claim that a society has solved a
social inequality, or that a social inequality has become benign, is itself ideological work. The
ideology of housewifery-as-modernity promulgated by advertisers keeps white middle-class women
ever more firmly in the home. The very time that labor-saving devices and the rationalization of the
US economy have permitted to women is given with one hand and taken away with the other. As
Friedan writes in the chapter “Housewifery Expands to Fill the Time Available,” “when the mystique
of feminine fulfillment sent women back home again, housewifery had to expand into a full-time

98

Friedan, The Feminine Mystique, 176.
Friedan, The Feminine Mystique, 184.
100
Friedan, The Feminine Mystique, 179.
101
Friedan, The Feminine Mystique, 181.
99

28

career … each labor-saving appliance brought a labor-demanding elaboration of housework. Each
scientific advance that might have freed women from the drudgery of cooking, cleaning, and
washing … instead imposed new drudgery, until housework not only expanded to fill the time
available, but could hardly be done in the available time [emphasis added].”102 Women are trapped
by the very wealth, the very devices, they are told to be grateful for.
The Feminine Mystique is thus a story of the totalitarian potential embedded in the
supposedly emancipatory forces of industrialization, automation, mechanization, and social science.
In Friedan’s telling, the freedom promised by modernity is premised on social control. Queer
theorist Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s 1991 claim that “social-engineering momentum [is] apparently
built into every one of the human sciences of the west” is also made, implicitly, by The Feminine
Mystique nearly 30 years earlier.103 Friedan’s critique can be seen as an extension of German
philosopher and sociologist Alfred Schutz’s earlier observation, quoted in Peter L. Berger and
Thomas Luckmann’s 1966 The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge:
“‘All typifications of common-sense thinking are themselves integral elements of the concrete
historical socio-cultural Lebenswelt within which they prevail as taken for granted and as socially
approved.’”104 Friedan’s contribution to the “sociology of knowledge” is to expose the problems
embedded in liberal ideologies of progress, to challenge totalizing assumptions of inevitable advance,
even while, as Rachel Bowlby notes, she herself employs a “triumphalist rhetoric of emancipation.”105
“The very twists of [Friedan’s] argument,” Bowlby recognizes, “with all the oddity of its details and
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contradictions … makes problematic the easy conceptualization of feminist progress.”106 In Juliet
Mitchell’s “Women: the Longest Revolution,” Friedan’s challenge is vastly extended and elaborated.
Chapter 2
“Women: the Longest Revolution”: Juliet Mitchell’s New Conceptual Paradigms
Where Betty Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique advances somewhat tentative claims about
connections between ideology and power, Juliet Mitchell’s 1966 article “Women: the Longest
Revolution,” published in the British socialist New Left Review, clearly states the linkages. Where
Betty Friedan, writing for a mass-market audience in the Cold War United States, cannot explicitly
refer to her Old Left roots or apply the theories of Marx or Engels to women’s situation,107 Mitchell
grounds her feminist critique in Marxist historical materialism. For Mitchell, the situation of
women is governed by exploitative contradictions. It is precarious and menaced even by
developments – industrialization, automation, the birth-control pill – that are thought to promote it.
Ironically for an essay published in a socialist journal and written with a Marxist framework,
Mitchell does not pay attention to class differences in women’s roles or self-conceptions. She
examines the status of women as women and not as baronesses or factory workers. “Women: the
Longest Revolution” is a short and pointed political manifesto, an overview of problems arising from
women’s situation, rather than a book-length exposé like The Feminine Mystique.108 What is
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significant about the essay is not simply that she takes the necessity and desirability of women’s
liberation for granted – not an automatic assumption even on the British Left in 1966 – but that she
moves the parameters of the discussion to an entirely new level.
Like The Feminine Mystique, “Women: the Longest Revolution” is keenly attuned to the
power relations embedded in dominant views of gender and sexuality. But where Friedan’s critique
of ideology-as-power is mainly implicit and indirect, Mitchell openly states that “there is nothing
inevitable about the form or role of the family any more than there is about the character or role of
women. It is the function of ideology to present these given social types as aspects of Nature itself
[emphasis added].”109 This forthrightly radical statement differs profoundly from the claims made
by earlier generations of suffragists and feminists. While many progressive Victorian and postVictorian Britons had earlier criticized aspects of family life they deemed detrimental to women’s
interests, only one person in early 20th-century Britain, to my knowledge, explicitly hoped to denaturalize the married couple (not so much the family itself) as the unit of the social: the feminist,
sexologist, and communist Stella Browne.110 As Mitchell herself points out later in her article, “[t]he
notion that ‘family’ and ‘society’ are virtually co-extensive terms, or that an advanced society not
founded on the nuclear family is now inconceivable, is widespread.”111 Simply by directly calling
this assumption into question, Mitchell challenges a fundamental organizing worldview of British
109
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society throughout the lifetimes of her readers. She opens up possibilities for entirely different forms
of social organization, in ways that, as we will see, go to the very conceptual core of the “political”
itself.
I.

Hegemonic Gender Ideology’s Emotional-Intellectual Work

“The situation of women is different from that of any other social group … Women are essential
and irreplaceable; they cannot therefore be exploited in the same way as other social groups can.
They are fundamental to the human condition, yet in their economic, social and political roles, they
are marginal. It is precisely this combination – fundamental and marginal at one and the same time
– that has been fatal to them.”112 These opening sentences of “Women: the Longest Revolution”
make clear to readers the profoundly unique nature of women’s subjection – the political, social, and
economic disadvantages they face not despite but because of their centrality in the human imaginary.
“Within the world of men,” Mitchell writes, “their position is comparable to that of an oppressed
minority; but they also exist outside the world of men. The one state justifies the other and
precludes protest.”113 In other words, it is precisely because the separate position of women, as
women, seems to be natural, biologically inevitable, advantageous to themselves and others, that it is
so difficult to recognize as unjust. It is worth noting here that one of the letters written to Betty
Friedan referenced just this sense of female isolation: Anne Parsons, the daughter of sociologist
Talcott Parsons, claimed that being an “‘unmarried career woman’” was “‘like being a Negro or Jew,
with the difference that the prejudices are manifest in such subtle ways that it is very hard to pin
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them down, and that the feminine mystique is so strong and attractive an ideology that it is very
hard to find a countervailing point of view from which to fight for oneself.’”114
As Mitchell herself acknowledges, “[t]here is no widespread demand for changes in [key
components of their status] on the part of women themselves – the governing ideology has
effectively prevented critical consciousness.”115 Here Mitchell employs the concept of false
consciousness, as deployed by Marx and subsequent Left thinkers, to explain women’s blindness to
their own interests.116 It is ideology – not nature or conflicting social patterns – that institutionalizes
women’s disadvantage. Ideology provides a useful tool for Mitchell to grasp the forces securing
women’s adherence to an inequitable status quo. She, like Friedan, understands that ideology
succeeds by presenting itself as immutable truth. “Like woman herself, the family appears as a
natural object, but it is actually a cultural creation … The ‘true’ woman and the ‘true’ family are
images of peace and plenty; in actuality they may both be sites of violence and despair … what Marx
wrote about the bourgeois myths of the Golden Ancient World describes precisely women’s realm:
‘in one way the child-like world of the ancients appears to be superior, and this is so, insofar as we
seek for closed shape, form and established limitation.’”117 Here Mitchell, following Friedan,
challenges the permanence of current concepts of “femininity” and “the family”, but adds a more
explicit criticism of the very concepts themselves. As Rachel Bowlby notes, The Feminine Mystique
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“fails to ask whether there is a difference [emphasis added]”118 between men and women; it also fails
to ask, in so many words, why “the family” is taken for granted as the basic social unit. Mitchell’s
ideology critique and social constructionism take a more radical form than Friedan’s, because the
former attends more to the concept of ideology itself.
As philosopher Charles Mills notes in his 2007 essay “White Ignorance,” it is through “the
category ‘ideology’” that “[i]n the orthodox left tradition, [the] set of issues [relating to the adequacy
of conceptions of the world] is handled.”119 Ideology is the conceptual rubric Mitchell uses to
explain the internal contradictions and inconsistencies of gender as a social structure. For Mitchell,
“the family” is not a given in relation to which women’s aspirations must be negotiated, but a
specifically bourgeois formation. “[W]omen’s role in reproduction has become, in capitalist society
at least, the spiritual ‘complement’ of men’s role in production. Bearing children, bringing them up,
and maintaining the home – these form the core of woman’s natural vocation, in this ideology. This
belief has attained great force because of the seeming universality of the family as a human institution
[emphasis added].”120 The family seems to be universal, but is not necessarily so. In a footnote,
Mitchell restates the contention of Philippe Ariès in his landmark 1960 Centuries of Childhood that
“though the family may in some form always have existed it was often submerged under more
forceful structures … according to Ariès it has only acquired its present significance with the advent
of industrialization.”121
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Mitchell’s offhand observation that “[b]ourgeois society is obsessed by the physical, moral and
sexual problems of childhood and adolescence”122 points to another paradoxical facet of the problem
of women’s status. As Lee Edelman notes in his 2004 book No Future: Queer Theory and the Death
Drive, “the fantasy subtending the image of the Child invariably shapes the logic within which the
political itself must be thought.”123 It also, historically, has shaped the logic within which the
problem of women’s status itself must be thought. Throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries,
conservative and radical women’s advocates and modernizing states justified reforms in women’s
legal, educational, and political position with reference to the strengthening of the hegemonic Child,
Home, Family, and Nation.124 This ambiguous legacy forms the backdrop against which Mitchell,
Friedan, and their contemporaries attempt to formulate new social roles for women.
Marxism, Mitchell notes, has failed to adequately grapple with the Woman Question. “[T]he
classical [socialist and communist] literature on the problem of woman’s condition is predominantly
economist in emphasis,”125 and so many of the social and psychological props of male supremacy and
female subordination are left unexamined. “The complete failure to give any operative content to
the slogan of ‘abolition’ of the family” has left a “void … occupied by [purportedly] traditional
beliefs.”126 What is striking here is Mitchell’s assumption that it is the obligation of people on the
Left to put forward alternatives to dominant familial ideology, and that only the absence of such
alternatives leads to a conservative cultural consensus. It is also remarkable that she assumes that
122
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international socialism and communism had always or even often made the “‘abolition’ of the
family” a central element in its program. Throughout much of the 19th and 20th centuries, it was on
behalf of the family and essentialist visions of womanhood that socialists and even communists in
modernizing states made their claims for wealth redistribution. Racist and organicist gender
ideologies had blinded many socialists of different nations to the possibilities of alternative family
formations.127
Significantly, it is in this section that Mitchell makes her only explicit reference to race and
racism. If from “[t]he biological function of maternity … follows … the stability and omnipresence
of the family … women’s social subordination – however emphasized as an honourable, but different
role (cf. the equal but ‘separate’ ideologies of Southern racists) – can be seen to follow inevitably as
an insurmountable bio-historical fact. The lynch-pin in this line of argument is the idea of the family
[emphasis in the original].”128 As Maxine Baca Zinn notes in her essay “The Family as a Race
Institution,” “[t]he dominant definition of ‘the family’ is an ideological code that expresses
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differences from and superiority over ‘other’ family forms … [s]ymbolic meanings of family are
shaped in opposition to the family forms of racial ‘others’.”129 The very hegemony of one type of
family in the British imagination, Mitchell implies, emerges from a complex of social hierarchies,
including racial hierarchy. “The beliefs [sic] that the family provides an impregnable enclave of
intimacy and security in an atomized and chaotic cosmos,” Mitchell writes, “assumes [sic] the
absurd.”130 As we will see later, Mitchell contends that this belief inhibits the development of radical
anti-capitalist critique. Her criticism of “equal but ‘separate’ ideologies” is part of a long historical
tradition of using anti-racist and other radical movements as entering wedges for raising feminist
claims.131
The central organizing principle of Mitchell’s essay is her “[differentiation]” of “woman’s
condition” into “separate structures, which together form a complex – not a simple – unity.”132 This
“complex unity” – of “Production, Reproduction, Sex and Socialization of children”133 – is always, in
an Althusserian sense, “‘overdetermined.’”134 Mitchell’s footnote on Althusser’s use of the Freudian
term “‘overdetermination’” emphasizes the complex interplay of temporality and dialectics in
Althusser’s thought; different aspects of the social structure have different “time-scales,” whose
“synthesis … means that sometimes contradictions cancel each other out and sometimes they
reinforce one another.”135 Mirra Komarovsky’s observation in her 1953 book Women in the Modern
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World: Their Education and Their Dilemmas – “‘technological and social changes over the past
century and a half have disturbed an old equilibrium without as yet replacing it with another. As a
result, our society is a veritable crazy quilt of contradictory beliefs and practices’”136 – provides a
similar, unacknowledged prefiguration of Mitchell’s dive into the paradox of change.
II.

Hegemonic Gender Ideology, Progress, and Temporality

Mitchell’s emphasis on the difficulty of distinguishing between progress and reaction parallels
Friedan’s. But whereas Friedan, in Bowlby’s words, “[sets] up feminism as freedom gained and
lost,”137 Mitchell understands history in a more circular than linear fashion. Recall her quotation
from Marx: ‘[T]he ancients provide a narrow satisfaction, whereas the modern world leaves us
unsatisfied or where it appears to be satisfied with itself, is vulgar and mean.”138 The implication
here is that neither an idealized past nor an open future can be looked to for contemporary panaceas.
This implication becomes more specific when Mitchell grapples with concrete ways of measuring
and actualizing progress. For Mitchell, earlier socialist discussions of women’s condition suffered
from an ahistorical, inadequately specific futurism. August Bebel’s canonical Woman in the Past,
Present and Future “was a vague reverie, quite disconnected from his description of the past”139;
Lenin “inherited a tradition of thought which … [equated] socialism with feminine liberation
without showing concretely how it would transform woman’s condition”140; even de Beauvoir’s
“prospect for women’s liberation at the end [of The Second Sex] is quite divorced from any historical
development.”141 Altogether, “the classical literature on the problem of woman’s condition … fails
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noticeably to project a convincing image of the future, beyond asserting that socialism will involve
the liberation of women as one of its constituent ‘moments.’”142 Here, Mitchell’s emphasis is on the
limitations of an open-ended assumption of progress – and, indeed, she problematizes the concept of
progress itself, prefiguring Edelman’s much later insight that “the hope of forging … some more
perfect social order … only reproduce[s] the constraining mandate of futurism.”143
For Edelman, “politics, however radical the means by which specific constituencies attempt to
produce a more desirable social order, remains, at its core, conservative insofar as it works to affirm a
structure, to authenticate social order, which it then intends to transmit to the future in the form of
its inner Child.”144 As Sara Pursley argues, “reproductive futurism [the term coined by Edelman] is
constituted by an interplay between cyclical-biological time and linear-historical time that is both
modern and nationalist. For female citizens, as agents of reproduction, this interplay heralds new
opportunities but also the consolidation of more formidable pressures. Having been finally freed
from the past, the nation‘s women were henceforth to be trapped in its future [emphasis added].”145
Mitchell grapples with the problem of what modernity can mean for women long before these
critical insights. There is for her no automatic road to women’s liberation, no one development
whose promise is free of potential setbacks, co-optations, or contradictions. We have seen how
cogently Betty Friedan criticized the labor-elaborating (techno)logics of household appliances.
Industrialization, as Mitchell points out in a footnote, has not reduced the time women must spend
142
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on housework: “it has been calculated in Sweden, that 2,340 million hours a year are spent by
women in housework compared with 1,290 million hours in industry. The Chase Manhattan Bank
estimated a woman’s overall working hours as averaging 99.6 per week.”146 Women, Mitchell
asserts, are exploited in the labor market as well as at home: “when the woman is gainfully employed
… her job tends to be inferior to that of the man’s, to which the family then adapts”147; “[w]omen
are poorly unionized (25 per cent) and receive less money than men for the work they do perform:
in 1961 the average industrial wage for women was less than half that for men, which … represents a
massive increment of exploitation for the employer.”148 (Unsurprisingly, Mitchell does not break
these statistics down by class.) Mitchell uses the Marxist concept of “coercion,” quoting Marx
himself for a definition – “[treating] the slave or serf as the ‘inorganic and natural condition of its
own reproduction’”149 – to explain the fact of women’s continued subordination: “coercion has been
ameliorated to an ideology shared by both sexes [emphasis added].”150 The structural relationship of
coercion and ideology is itself dialectical – women are “anatomically smaller and weaker,”151 but
historically have been given enormous amounts of backbreaking labor to do.152
In an earlier (1964) article for New Left Review on “Women’s Education,” Mitchell notes the
ominous potential of the increased free time promised by automation: “Automation will bring more
leisure, women must be trained to provide this. Simone de Beauvoir hoped that automation would
eliminate man’s physical superiority over woman … but if automation is seen … as the harbinger of
a consumer civilization where leisure becomes a prolonged private domesticity, this instrument of
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potential liberation could in itself become the most serious contemporary threat to women’s
emancipation.”153 In “Women: the Longest Revolution,” Mitchell extends this insight into a
prediction of women’s insecure status in a postmodern workplace: “[i]ndustrial labor and automated
technology both promise the preconditions for woman’s liberation … but no more than the
preconditions … De [sic] Beauvoir hoped that automation would make a decisive, qualitative
difference … [b]ut any reliance on this … accords an independent role to technique which history
does not justify. Under capitalism, automation could lead to an … [expulsion of] women – the
latest and least integrated recruits to the labour force and ideologically the most expendable for a
bourgeois society … from production after only a brief interlude in it.”154
Why are women “ideologically the most expendable” waged workers “for a bourgeois society?”
Surprise, surprise – it is Edelman’s Child! “Women’s absence from the critical sector of production
historically … has been caused not just by their physical weakness … but also by their role in
reproduction.”155 Historically, opposition to married women’s work outside the home has been
greatly influenced by the fear of its detrimental impact on children. Friedan assures her readers that
“[i]n countries like Israel and Russia, where women are expected to be more than just housewives …
home and children and love are evidently not neglected.”156 She does not challenge the assumption
that it is mothers who must care for children. Mitchell has a different orientation.157
“[R]eproduction, sexuality, and the socialization of children … are historically, not intrinsically,
related to each other in the present modern family.”158 The “suitability” of women for socializing
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children does not automatically equate to the “inevitability” of their serving as socializing agents.159
Mitchell accepts that “we know far more than ever before how delicate and precarious a process the
passage from birth to childhood is for everyone. The fate of the adult personality can be largely
decided in the initial months of life.”160 These findings represent “undoubted advances in the
scientific understanding of childhood,”161 but “the need for permanent, intelligent care of children in
the initial three or four years of their lives can be (and has been) exploited ideologically to perpetuate
the family as a total unit, when its other functions have been visibly declining.”162 The “emphasis of
familial ideology” is itself subject to historical change; it has “shifted away from a cult of the
biological ordeal of maternity … to a celebration of mother-care as a social act.”163 Historical
changes – the shrinking both of the family and of the time women spend in caring for children –
mean that “the qualitative importance of socialization during the early years of the child’s life has
acquired a much greater significance than in the past – while the quantitative amount of a mother’s
life spent either in gestation or child-rearing has greatly diminished.”164 Like Friedan, Mitchell here
implies, but does not state, that supposedly incontestable scientific knowledge has a social-historical
as well as an independent factual basis. The very factors of modern life that have minimized certain
aspects of the maternal role – and that, therefore, could work towards women’s liberation from the
home – have maximized other aspects of that role.
Furthermore, Mitchell recognizes even more explicitly than Friedan the potential of
“progressive” developments to recreate existing forms of inequality. Polygamy – in ancient China,
for example – was certainly “a total derogation of woman’s autonomy, and [constituted] an extreme
159
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form of oppression,” but “[i]n the West … the advent of monogamy was in no sense an absolute
improvement. It certainly did not create a one-to-one equality – far from it.”165 In the 16th century
in England, “[c]apitalism and the attendant demands of the newly emergent bourgeoisie accorded
woman a new status as wife and mother … The formal, juridical equality of capitalist society and
capitalist rationality now applied as much to the marital as to the labour contract. In both cases,
nominal parity masks real exploitation and inequality. But in both cases the formal equality is itself
a certain progress, which can help to make possible a further advance.”166 The birth-control pill
could mean that “child-bearing … need no longer be the sole or ultimate vocation of woman,”167 but
“oral contraception … has so far been developed in a form which exactly repeats the sexual
inequality of Western society.”168 We have already seen Mitchell’s skepticism about the potential of
industrialization and automation to liberate women: as she phrases it elsewhere in the article,
“automation promises the technical possibility of abolishing completely the physical differential
between man and woman … but under capitalist relations of production, the social possibility of this
abolition is permanently threatened, and can easily be turned into its opposite, the actual diminution
of woman’s role in the labour force.”169 Mitchell asserts that the percentage of women in England’s
labor force has barely increased since 1911, although, again, she does not provide a class breakdown
of this statistic.170 Moreover, the proportion of female to male university students has not changed
in England since the 1920s (here again, a class breakdown of the statistic is lacking)171 – and, as
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Mitchell notes in “Women’s Education,” the equivalent proportion of women in the United States
has actually decreased.172
In both “Women’s Education” and “Women: the Longest Revolution,” Mitchell, a British
socialist, drops subtle hints that the United States is actually less, not more, progressive than Europe
in the matter of women’s status, not despite its wealth and international hegemony, but because of
it. In “Women’s Education,” she reminds her readers that the United States is “the most developed
capitalist country of all”173 immediately before letting her readers know about the decrease in the
proportion of women to men students there. Furthermore, “within this decrease there is evidence
that greater and greater numbers of women are choosing courses that will be useful for marriage and
maternity, not for a career. With structural unemployment running at 6 million a year, the
American economy is likely to have less work to offer women. In Europe this is not yet the case.”174
(As in “Women: the Longest Revolution,” so in “Women’s Education,” Mitchell does not provide
class breakdowns of these statistics.) In “Women: the Longest Revolution,” Mitchell notes that the
US birthrate in the decade preceding her article has outstripped that of “under-developed” countries
such as India.175 “[T]his reflects … the lesser economic burden of a large family in conditions of
economic boom in the richest country in the world. But it also reflects the magnification of familial
ideology as a social force.”176 Certainly gender conservatism was widespread across the postwar
world; it was not specific to the United States. But Mitchell was correct about the relationship
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between consumer capitalism, a “bigger and better” ethos, and conservative domestic ideology.177
This brings us to Mitchell’s understanding of the contradictions and inconsistencies in dominant
ideologies of gender and social progress.
III.

Hegemonic Gender Ideology’s Althusserian Dialectics

Mitchell’s understanding of contradiction as a driving force of gender conservatism parallels
Friedan’s, in that they both grasp the complex and paradoxical relationships between and among
economic growth, rationalization, automation, liberal democracy, and social insistence on women’s
domestic role. For Mitchell, women’s economic situation is, and has been historically, full of
contradictions. We have seen her claim that industrialization and automation do not automatically
equate to women’s liberation, and in fact can even result in their further exclusion from wage labor
(assuming, as she does for the purposes of “Women’s Education” and “Women: the Longest
Revolution,” that women are a unitary entity not divided by class – or race). We have also seen her
claim that the very economic changes that reduce the importance of certain aspects of women’s
maternal role also elaborate and extend other aspects of it. The underlying paradox here (which
Friedan, as we have seen, also addresses) is that economic and political modernity and increased
prosperity, which bring concrete material and psychological benefits to women, also contract their
aspirations and impose on them new restrictions.
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It is helpful here to quote sociologist Alice Rossi, a co-founder, with Friedan, of the National
Organization for Women. In a 1965 magazine article, “Women in Science: Why So Few?” Rossi
quotes Harriet Martineau’s 1834 claim that “‘the prosperity of America is a circumstance
unfavorable to its women,’ meaning women are not ‘put to the proof as to what they are capable of
thinking and doing.’”178 Rossi also notes that “[s]ome child specialists may say that the mother is
more necessary at home than ever, not only to love and care for the child but to stimulate the growing
mind of the child [emphasis added].”179 Recall Mitchell’s own recognition that “we know far more
than ever before how delicate and precarious a process the passage from birth to childhood is for
everyone [emphasis added].” Not even Rossi or Mitchell can fully recognize the cultural bias
embedded in the idea that science, as such, has the right to claim from women “better” or “more”
care than in the past. Yet Mitchell recognizes that the very exaltation of women’s role as mothers is
the Janus face of their low social status: “[E]ven if the woman has emotional control over her child,
legally and economically both she and it are subject to the father. The social cult of maternity is
matched by the real socio-economic powerlessness of the mother. The psychological and practical
benefits men receive from this are obvious.”180 Furthermore, “[u]ltimate responsibility for [problems
of childhood and adolescence] is placed on the mother.”181 The modernizing ideology of postwar
motherhood was, like its earlier moral and republican version, “both empowering and humiliating,”
as Gail Collins writes in When Everything Changed: The Amazing History of American Women from
1960 to the Present.182
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Mitchell recognizes the contradictions in dominant ideologies of sexuality and their alteration as
they relate to women’s status as well. “Historically … there has been a dialectical movement, in
which sexual expression was ‘sacrificed’ in an epoch of more-or-less puritan repression, which
nevertheless produced a greater parity of sexual roles, which in turn creates the precondition for a
genuine sexual liberation.”183 Nonetheless, although “the current wave of sexual liberalization …
could become conducive to the general freedom of women[,] [e]qually it could presage new forms of
oppression. The puritan-bourgeois creation of woman as ‘counterpart’ has produced the
precondition for emancipation. But it gave statutary [sic] legal equaility [sic] to the sexes at the cost
of greatly intensified repression.”184 The promise of change, here as elsewhere, is always already a
threat as well. “[T]he dominant sexual ideology,” Mitchell notes, “is proving less and less successful
… [sexuality] … is evidently the weak link in the chain – the particular structure that is the site of
the most contradictions.”185 These contradictions have “progressive potential,”186 but they are also
products of a capitalist society, and are symptoms of Herbert Marcuse’s “‘repressive desublimation,’” which Mitchell defines as “the freeing of sexuality for its own frustration in the service
of a totally co-ordinated and drugged social machine.”187 For Mitchell, the so-called sexual
revolution, “while it presently may contain the greatest potential for liberation – can equally well be
organized against any increase in its human possibilities. New forms of reification are emerging
which may void sexual freedom of any meaning.”188
More broadly, “the liberation of women can only be achieved if all four structures [production,
reproduction, sex, and socialization of children] in which they are integrated are transformed. A
183
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modification of any one of them can be offset by a reinforcement of another, so that mere
permutation of the form of exploitation is achieved.”189 Women’s suffrage, “though a simple
completion of the formal legal equality of bourgeois society … left the socio-economic situation of
women virtually unchanged. The wider legacy of the suffrage was nil: the suffragettes proved quite
unable to go beyond their initial demands, and many of their leading figures later became extreme
reactionaries.”190 The Soviet Union in the 1920s passed astonishingly radical legislation “aimed at
liberating women above all in the field of sexuality,” but the effects of this were seen to be so
destabilizing that “Stalinism soon produced a restoration of iron traditional norms.”191 In
contemporary China, “all the emphasis is being placed on liberating women in production. This has
produced an impressive social promotion of women. But it has been accompanied by a tremendous
repression of sexuality and a rigorous puritanism [emphasis in the original].”192 The implication
here, as with Friedan, is that the idea of liberation can easily be turned into its opposite, and that, in
fact, that the concept of “liberation” can be only one side of a coin of social control.
For Mitchell, a really desirable change in women’s condition requires “a transformation of all the
structures into which they are integrated, and an [Althusserian] ‘unité de rupture.’”193 Althusser uses
the term “unité de rupture” in For Marx, in trying to explain how revolution happens.194
Elaborating on the Leninist metaphor of the “weak link in the chain,”195 Althusser explains that
“anyone who wants to attack [a situation] … need only discover [its] one weakness to make all its
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power precarious.”196 Mitchell, as we have seen, uses the phrase “the weak link in the chain” to
describe “the structure that is the site of the most contradictions” – sexuality.197 But we have seen
that neither changes in the sexual structure nor in any of her other three structures automatically
“liberate” women. If radical social changes in the industrialized West, and even in the Eastern Bloc,
have not resulted in real freedom for women, the implication is that the mutually reinforcing aspects
of their disadvantageous position require an explosive force to obliterate the tendencies of
overdetermination.
I argue that the “lynch-pin” of her insight into women’s condition is indeed her challenge to
“the idea of the family.” Mitchell is well aware of the ways in which women’s labor-force
participation has been played off against their family responsibilities, to the detriment of their
position in both areas. Historically, the vulnerabilities of women in the labor market – their lack of
choices, inability to advance up the job ladder, unsanitary conditions, sexual exploitation, and low
pay – have been corollaries of their responsibility for social reproduction in the home. Mitchell
seems to grasp that as long as a hegemonic Family is held up as the foundation of British society and
the very essence of its continuation, conservative gender ideology will prevail. Mitchell goes beyond
the majority of earlier suffragists and feminists in her refusal to accept that women are wives and
mothers first and foremost. Although “[m]odern industrial development … tends toward the
separating out of the originally unified function of the family … procreation, socialization, sexuality,
economic subsistence, etc.,” such “‘structural differentiation’ … has been checked and disguised by
the maintenance of a powerful family ideology.”198 The circle must be squared; modernity must be
made to live up to its potential. The very “attempt to focus women’s existence exclusively on
196
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bringing up children, is manifestly harmful to children … Exclusive maternity is often in this sense
‘counter-productive.’”199 But it is just as wrong to simply call for “the ‘abolition of the bourgeois
family.’ This slogan … is maximalist in the bad sense, posing a demand which is merely a negation
without any coherent construction subsequent to it.”200 A totalizing, negative aim is worse than no
aim at all, since it leaves unchallenged the concept that is being negated. It is the concept of the
family itself, in Mitchell’s view, which must be rethought.
“[A]ll human experience shows that intersexual and intergenerational relationships are infinitely
various … while the institutionalized expression of them in our capitalist society is utterly simple
and rigid.”201 This points to another paradox of the postwar era: at the very point when the
multiplication of human activity along various lines of endeavor should have ensured a less socially
constrained life for everyone, rigid conceptions of the family and women’s role became even more
hegemonic.202 This contradiction is neatly captured by Jessica Weiss: “[t]he Cold War liberalism
that nourished Friedan’s ideals of individual equality for women harbored a contradictory ideal that
pulled just as strongly in the opposite direction. In this view, women’s continued selflessness in the
face of increased options created individualism in the next generation.”203 Mitchell wrestles with this
central problem of reproduction, rights, and power: “No human being can create another human
being. A person’s biological origin is an abstraction. The child as an autonomous person inevitably
threatens the activity which claims to create it continually merely as a possession of the parent …
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[a]nything the child does is therefore a threat to the mother herself who has renounced her
autonomy through this misconception of her reproductive role.”204
The paradoxes of women’s situation thus go to the very heart of what it means to be human - the
very heart of humanity’s potential for biological, psychological, and social growth and change. For
Simone de Beauvoir in The Second Sex, “what peculiarly signalizes the situation of woman” is “that
she – a free and autonomous being like all human creatures – nevertheless finds herself living in a
world where men compel her to assume the status of the Other. They propose to stabilize her as
object and to doom her to immanence [emphasis added]” – in other words, men block women from
“a continual reaching out toward other liberties … [an] expansion into an indefinitely open
future.”205 Here de Beauvoir hitches her wagon to the star of futurism – but, as we shall see, her and
Mitchell’s futurism is different from the reproductive futurism Edelman criticizes. The end of
“Women: the Longest Revolution” shares de Beauvoir’s emphasis on temporality and progress; it is a
paragraph-long disquisition – with quotes from Marx – on the desirability of an open-ended vision
of the future.
“Circumstantial accounts of the future,” Mitchell writes, “are idealist and worse, static.
Socialism will be a process of change, of becoming.”206 Mitchell quotes Marx’s definition of
progress: “‘the absolute elaboration of (man’s) creative dispositions, without any preconditions other
than antecedent historical evolution which makes the totality of this evolution – i.e. the evolution of
all human powers as such, unmeasured by any previously established yardstick – an end in itself … a
situation where man does not reproduce himself in any determined form, but produces his totality[.]
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Where he does not seek to remain something formed by the past, but is the absolute movement of
becoming[.]’”207 For Mitchell – as well as for Marx and de Beauvoir – the ideal of progress is an
anti-reproductive futurism, a repudiation of what de Beauvoir calls “the ‘en-soi’ – the brutish life of
subjection to given conditions.”208 This kind of progress contrasts with that envisioned by the
experts criticized by Friedan, who commend the “modern bride” for consciously “[choosing] among
all possible careers the career of wife-mother-homemaker.” The emphasis of the latter kind of
progress is on rationalized planning for limited options; the emphasis of the former kind of progress
is on movement toward an unspecified, but always implicitly revolutionary, end, one not confined by
contemporary prejudices. The irony here is that Mitchell, who has criticized earlier socialist thinkers
for their failure to paint a clear picture of a free society, is no more able to give a definite account of
the future than they were. We see here the ultimate reliance of radical thought on shifting goalposts
and reference points; the alternative to the “‘closed form and established limitation’” of Marx’s past
is not a wholly closed and established program, but an indefinitely expandable period of trial and
error. Futurism functions dialectically in radical thought, split between the conflicting imperatives
of creative freedom and concrete planning.
Thus Mitchell, as influenced by de Beauvoir and Marx, carefully rethinks the relationships
between and among reproduction, freedom, improvement, progress, and temporality. Many
suffragists and feminists in Victorian and Edwardian Britain had shared an Edelmanian focus on the
Child and had described women in essentialist, familial terms; as noted by Sandra Stanley Holton in
her 1986 book Feminism and Democracy: Women’s Suffrage and Reform Politics in Britain, 19001918, they had claimed “that because women mothered they were more caring and nurturant … [i]t
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was … claimed that women, because they nurtured and men did not, could offer skills and
understanding of particular relevance to … the education of children, public health, and the
management and care of the poor.”209 One early 20th-century suffragist claimed the vote on the basis
of “‘our very womanhood, with its inborn instinct to childward care’”210; another, agreeing with an
anti-suffragist that “‘no sane person can deny that men and women are different, for Nature has
made them so. It is only in combination as a group – father, mother, child – that they reach
completion; it is only thus in the effort of rearing children for the race that they best develop,’”
added, “my belief in the truth of this contention is my chief reason for believing in the necessity for
removing the sex-disability.”211 Mitchell, writing some six decades later, recognizes that such
organicist and biologist views of the family and women’s role can handicap a critical socialist
approach. For Mitchell – and Friedan – it is not enough to claim that women’s difference, their
unique moral qualities, their familial responsibilities, necessitate an improvement in their political
and social position. They take a more radical approach – an approach that assumes that natural is a
smokescreen for ideological. Women are not mothers who can nurture the nation, but individuals
who are trapped by the very concept of motherhood and the ideological and discursive formations
surrounding it.
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Conclusion
Feminism as a social current has never been a unitary entity. It is precisely because the
political category of “women” and the arguments made on behalf of improving their social position
have been so internally inconsistent and incomplete – and yet so profoundly relevant for the lives of
all those identified as “women” and all those identified as belonging to other gender categories – that
the historical evolution of these arguments is so absorbing a topic of study. For the two authors
under discussion in this essay and for others before and after them, constituting “women” as a
political group whose status should be changed has meant grappling with complex and shifting
realities of power, status, language, and temporality. As I have shown, for Betty Friedan and Juliet
Mitchell to challenge established views on the proper relationship of “women” to 1960s modernity
in its manifold forms (automation, globalization, the so-called sexual revolution), they had to
recognize that “scientific,” psychoanalytic, and consumerist discourses were not the final word on the
nature and proper functions of women. They had to understand how the discursive field of
possibilities for social change was constructed and delimited and how it could be expanded. Last,
but not least, they had to recognize the complexity of liberal reformism, of proposals for social
change that proposed to partially restructure these relations.
It is evident that the work of both Friedan and Mitchell is radical on all three of these counts.
Friedan, as we have seen, uses the words of Freudian psychologists and Freudian-influenced social
scientists against them; she performs a masterful close reading of Margaret Mead in particular,
alerting her readers to the inherently unstable, contradictory, and challenging nature of liberal
claims. Mitchell goes even further in her recognition of gender and sexuality as ideological structures
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mediated by society as a whole, profoundly shaped by the ever-present possibilities of compromise
and retreat.
If there is any foundation on which the critical epistemologies and disciplines of the post-1960s
Left and postmodernism in general rest, it is the conviction that virtually every feature of the
physical, social, and political world is mediated if not actually created by shifting fields of powerknowledge – with the explosive corollary that there is no given beyond which human social
formations cannot go, no unchangeable hierarchy of bodies, knowledge, and institutions. What
makes this most radical of all human insights possible is a critical concept of ideology. This concept
not only enables the leap from an organicist theological worldview such as that of medieval Europe,
but the leap – hardly less revolutionary – from a Victorian Darwinist worldview in which hierarchies
of gender, race, and physical “fitness” were construed as having a biological basis, beyond which they
could only shift so far, if at all.212
This theoretical shift, with its profound implications for all forms of human thought, is
anticipated in the work of Friedan and Mitchell. It is, of course, wholly erroneous to claim that
either Friedan or Mitchell go to the extreme of claiming that there are no “pure” facts, no absolute
realities. But their work is hugely important for feminist ideology critique, critical theory, and social
constructionism, which are crucial pillars of a coherent anti-racist, anti-sexist, and anti-homophobic
philosophy. Radical ideology critique is important precisely because of its vulnerability and fragility,
its rootedness in the very structures of domination it tries to undo; the histories of 19th- and 20thcentury feminism – and of the abolitionism that was its progenitor – vividly illustrate this. What is
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significant about Friedan and Mitchell is not simply that they issue fundamental challenges to male
dominance as an organizing principle of society – itself a profoundly difficult, and still unusual,
endeavor in the 1960s – but that they recognize the contradictions and vulnerabilities in such
challenges. To understand that deep and corrosive injustices are foundational to a society, and to
recognize that surface changes will not eliminate them, takes a unique act of imagination and
courage. But to recognize that there is no pure form of resistance to these injustices, to question
totalizing narratives and utopian, conflict-free visions of a social order, is to attain a historically
unprecedented profundity of moral awareness.
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